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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The ultimate goal of peacebuilding is to prevent the resurgence of war, ensure sustainable 
peace and security, and restore trust within communities and institutions (Diehl and Balas, 
2014; Lambourne, 2009; von Hehn, 2011). In order to do so, it is imperative that we 
understand the factors that can impede post-conflict reconstruction, including the aftermath 
of such type of factors, and learn how to mitigate their impact. In this regard, scholars have 
investigated a large pool of both endogenous and exogenous elements that can affect 
peacebuilding success, notably, inter alia: ethno-cultural identity, natural resource 
availability and dependence, democratization process, and international aid (Aitken, 2007; 
Green, 2015; Ottaway, 2007; Pouligny, 2005). For example, Aitken (2007, p. 263) argues 
that during the peace and institution-building process, policy-makers should take note of the 
transformation of identity meaning and salience during and after a conflict. By applying 
centripetal principles to institutional design, this avoids incentives for ethnic mobilization in 
the short-term and may potentially empower the emergence of new identities and political 
mobilization (ibid). Foregoing this recommendation would potentially result in the 
resurgence of war as polarized ethnic identities become institutionalized, with those 
dominating larger groups continuing to subjugate smaller groups (ibid, p. 262).  
 
Despite the amount of research surrounding peacebuilding, and the factors affecting its 
success, there is one area that has been critically under-researched: wartime sexual violence. 
According to Cohen and Nordås (2014, p. 419), sexual violence is comprised of seven key 
components: (1) sexual slavery, (2) sexual mutilation, (3) sexual torture, (4) rape, (5) forced 
prostitution, (6) forced pregnancy, and finally (7) forced sterilization and/or abortion. 
Wartime sexual violence in the framework of peacebuilding has only recently begun to draw 
attention with the passing of United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1820 (2008, 
p. 2) which stated: “sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to 
deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian 
populations…may impede the restoration of international peace and security”. The resolution 
also affirmed that responding effectively to the occurrence of sexual violence in conflict “can 
significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security” (ibid). 
 
The extant literature on wartime sexual violence has predominantly focused on examining its 
purpose (Haer, Hecker, and Maedl, 2015), specifically the purpose of rape as a weapon of 
war during conflict (Maedl, 2011), with some also examining the variation in its pattern of 
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use during civil wars (Wood, 2009; Cohen, 2013). Other research has tended to focus on the 
micro and meso-level effects of wartime sexual violence, which include, inter alia: the spread 
of sexually transmitted infections (Leaning, Bartels and Mowafi, 2009, p. 193), psychological 
consequences such as depression (Verelst et al., 2014, p. 1139), social ostracism (Dossa et al., 
2014, p. 244), and community disintegration (Leiby, 2009, p. 451). What is lacking in this 
area of research is a systematic study on the effects of sexual violence on the macro-level, 
particularly on peacebuilding efforts. Research into this area is particularly crucial given that 
consequences of wartime sexual violence are highly destructive and likely to permeate into 
and hinder the post-conflict peacebuilding process (Copleon, 1994, p. 256; Vinck et al., 2007, 
p. 543; Leiby, 2009, p. 451; Pankhurst, 2010, p. 151). Indeed, in comparison to other human 
rights abuses, the psychological, social, and physical damages as a result of the use of 
wartime sexual violence continue to pervade long after the end of armed conflict, potentially 
hampering the ability of societies to rebuild in its wake (Guterres, 2017, p. 7; Cohen, 2013, p. 
462; Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 263-266; Vinck et al., 2007, p. 543; Chitsike and Nkuuhe, 
2014, p. 48).  
 
Given the great potential for wartime sexual violence to impede peacebuilding efforts, it is 
puzzling that these two areas of study have not been connected. In order to increase the 
probability of success of future peacebuilding efforts, and decrease the chance of relapse into 
conflict, it is therefore imperative that “ways of dealing with wartime sexual violence are 
incorporated into the policy planning of these [international peacebuilding] operations” 
(Skjelsbæk, 2001, p. 81). Accordingly, this research purports to investigate the explanatory 
research question: How does wartime sexual violence affect peacebuilding efforts? Through 
the investigation of this research question, this research thus fills a gap in literature – thereby 
contributing to the scientific discourse of war and gender – as well as aids policy-makers and 
practitioners in their efforts to build sustainable peace for war-affected societies. 
 
1.1 Overview of thesis structure  
This thesis contains six chapters and proceeds as follows: chapter 2 gives an overview of the 
relevant extant literature on peacebuilding and sexual violence, combined with the theoretical 
framework guiding the research, and presents the hypothesis to be tested. Chapter 3 gives 
details about the main research strategy used to investigate the research question and test the 
proposed hypothesis. Chapter 4 presents and critically analyses the results of the quantitative 
large-N study by linking the theoretical expectations with the empirical evidence. Chapter 5 
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presents the chosen deviant case study that is derived from the results of the quantitative 
research. Finally, chapter 6 contains a summary of the findings and their implications for 
literature and policy, along with the limitations of this investigation, and explores avenues for 
potential future research. 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Peacebuilding 
The term ‘peacebuilding’ is often conflated with a variety of other conflict resolution terms 
such as ‘peacemaking’, ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘peace-enforcement’; however each of these terms 
has decidedly different meanings. According to Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 779), as it 
currently stands “peacebuilding is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, 
to address the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution”. 
Peacemaking is defined as the move made by involved parties away from violent conflict to 
cooperation and dispute settlement (Bartoli, 2011, p. 546; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and 
Miall, 2005, p. 30). Peacekeeping is the intervention of foreign military personnel, typically 
with the consent of the host state, with a view to securing peace and decreasing the changes 
of continued violence (Beardsley, 2011, p. 1052). Accordingly peacebuilding, the critical 
concept for this research, refers to the process in post-conflict reconstruction during which 
the structural issues and the long term relations of the parties are addressed, thereby 
supporting the work accomplished during the peacemaking and peacekeeping phases 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2005, p. 30). International peacebuilding can be 
divided into four different kinds of mandated operations: (1) monitoring or observer mission, 
(2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) multidimensional peacekeeping, and (4) peace enforcement 
(Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 781). Each of these international peacebuilding strategies, 
though individually designed for specific situations, must address four general parameters 
found in most conflicts, namely: “the local sources of hostility, the local capacities for 
change, and the (net) specific degree of international commitment available to assist change” 
(ibid). 
 
Understanding what are the determining factors of successful peacebuilding has been a 
subject of interest in conflict resolution literature. Research has looked into a number of 
potential determining factors including, inter alia, natural resource availability and 
dependence and conflict type to name a couple (Ross, 2006, p. 266; Sambanis, 2010, p. 152; 
Fortna, 2003; Gartner, 2016). For example, research by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, p. 17) has 
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shown that countries that are dependent on primary commodity exports have an increased 
risk of conflict, making peacebuilding success less likely. This is because rebel organizations 
are able to finance themselves using the “revenue from the informal taxation of the rents on 
primary commodity exports – diamonds, cocaine, and timber are notable examples” (ibid). 
Additionally, resource dependent countries may weaken state institutions and render the 
nation more vulnerable to the effect of trade shocks, thereby facilitating rebellion and inciting 
separatism in resource abundant areas (Ross, 2006, p. 266). Regarding conflict type, Fortna’s 
(2003, p. 112) research has found that, in contradiction to conventional wisdom, maintaining 
peace after civil wars is much the same to maintaining peace after interstate wars. That is, the 
peacebuilding dynamics of the two types of wars are not as different as previously believed. 
However, this finding is still highly contested with authors such as Gartner (2012, p. 72-73) 
citing that the comparative difficulty of resolving intrastate wars is much higher than 
interstate wars due to: significant power asymmetries, status difference, and zero-sum issues. 
Paris (2016, p. 510) concurs with this line of argument by citing that civil wars have a higher 
likelihood of conflict resurgence in comparison to interstate wars, as evidenced by ‘repeat 
civil war’ being the most recurrent type of conflict.  
 
Of most relevance for this research, however, is wartime violence (of which sexual violence 
is a subset) as a determining factor of peacebuilding success. Violence during conflict 
manifests itself in a varied number of forms, with each form entailing differing but 
occasionally intertwining effects (Reychler, 2001, p. 5). It is therefore important to make a 
distinction between them in order to properly define the scope of this research. Structural 
violence is a subtle form of violence that occurs when particular members of society are 
deprived of their ‘human need satisfaction’ through economic and political structures 
(Christie, 1997, p. 315). If the structural violence experienced during war is not redressed 
during the post-conflict peacebuilding process, then the likelihood of successful 
peacebuilding diminishes (Richmond, 2014). This is because continued structural violence 
“may provoke more inequality, which weakens the links between civil society, solidarity, 
social justice, human rights and democracy” (ibid, p. 462). Rectifying structural violence is 
part of the larger peacebuilding effort of changing the perceptions and attitudes of post-
conflict societies towards one another, thereby fostering sustainable peace (Staud et al., 2005, 
p. 300). Accordingly, as argued by Galtung (1969), the halting and prevention of structural 
violence is associated with the establishment of a more sustainable form of peacebuilding: the 
establishment of ‘positive peace’. It should be noted that addressing this form of violence 
	 9 
during peacebuilding is challenging, particularly in authoritarian regimes, because it directly 
threatens the prevailing status quo (Noor, 2009, p. 307).  
 
Another form of violence that may occur during wartime is psychological violence. 
Psychological violence is comprised of behaviors or threats of behaviors aiming to demean, 
demoralize, and/or intimidate by harming another person’s psyche (MacNair, 2012, p. 90; 
Gitau, 2018, p. 109; Reychler, 2006, p. 137). This type of violence can be just as harmful as 
direct physical violence (Augustin, 2013, p. 59). The presence of psychological violence 
during conflict produces “a constant state of fear, characterized by intense trepidation and 
anxiety” (Konstantinović-Vilić, 2000, p. 102). In post-conflict societies, victims of 
psychological violence may suffer from depression, stress, suicidal thoughts, and have 
intense desire for revenge (ibid, p. 102-105). Addressing the consequences of wartime 
psychological violence increases the probability of successful peacebuilding because victims 
are less likely to participate in post-conflict ‘defensive’ violence (Staud et al., 2005, p. 300). 
 
Lastly armed or physical violence, the most overt form of violence, is intended “to deter, 
coerce, wound, and even kill people” (Reychler, 2001, p. 5). This type of ‘direct’ violence is 
most often investigated in peacebuilding research through proxies such as number of deaths 
and displacements (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Other factors that have been investigated as 
conducive to increasing the level of direct violence, because they increase the level of 
hostility, include the number of factions and war duration (Gurses and Rost, 2013; Sambanis 
and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009). The number of opposing factions present during the 
peacebuilding process has been found to impact the likelihood of its success (Doyle and 
Sambanis, 2006, p. 65). Each and every singular faction has its own set of needs and interests 
that must be taken into consideration during peacebuilding. Accordingly when the number of 
factions increases, so does the amount of differing needs and interests, thereby complicating 
coordination and cooperation amongst them and increasing tensions and hostilities 
(Sambanis, 2010, p. 152). Additionally, another obstacle related to factional reconciliation 
during the peacebuilding process is that of faction leaders (Jan, 2001, p. 63). Faction leaders, 
sometimes referred to as ‘warlords’, can ‘spoil’ peacebuilding efforts because their power 
emanates from protecting the interests of their ‘constituents’, including the control of land, 
against others (ibid). Thus, reconciliation and peace pose a threat to their power and they may 
continue to incite violence and provoke the resurgence of war in order to safeguard their 
position. 
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Extant literature on the impact of the duration of a conflict on peace is decisively divided. 
Some authors like Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001, p. 190) posit the argument that 
protracted wars actually increase the probability of stable peace after war because 
belligerents will have grown fatigued of fighting and believe their chances of winning to 
diminish as the conflict continues. Mason and Fett (1996, p. 552) support this line of 
reasoning by arguing that the estimate net utility of victory of parties lowers as the conflict 
endures because the estimate of the accumulated costs of conflict grows. Thus, during 
peacebuilding belligerents have no interest in the recurrence of war because it would simply 
mean a return to a stalemate with mounting costs and a diminished probability of defeating 
the opponent. Conversely, Walter’s (2004, p. 384) research found that war duration was 
significantly associated with triggering the onset of a new war because previously fought 
wars that were long revealed information about the opponent’s willingness to fight and 
concede, thereby removing the uncertainty of war initiation. Furthermore, longer wars can 
also foster distrust between the belligerents making peacebuilding less likely (Roehner, 2012, 
p. 50). It should be noted that it is difficult to measure the impact of solely war duration on 
peacebuilding because it is so strongly associated with other factors like the intensity of war 
as well as party polarization (ibid). 
 
‘Direct violence’ is of further particular interest as a determinant factor of peacebuilding 
success because it engenders costs that are suffered by both the combatants and supporters of 
the conflict. The ‘costs’ of war typically refer to the human costs – often measured by the 
amount of deaths suffered – and have been found to negatively impact peacebuilding, 
because high levels of casualties may solidify animosity and mistrust between the parties 
(Manson and Quinn, 2006, p. 23). Indeed, the desire for vengeance may persist following the 
end of war and incentivize the recurrence of conflict in order to exact retribution (Walter, 
2004, p. 373 in ibid). However, it is arguable that wars which experienced higher costs – 
human or otherwise – are less vulnerable to war recurrence because the available capabilities 
(i.e. supplies and amount of fighting bodies) are depleted (Walter, 2004, p. 373, citing Rosen, 
1972). Research into the effects of the human costs of war has predominantly chosen to focus 
on deaths simply because it can more easily be measured than sexual violence (Kalyvas, 
2006, p. 20, cited in Cohen, 2013, p. 462). Yet, arguably, the effects of sexual violence might 
have a larger impact than other forms of direct violence since perpetrators are often not 
identified and/or prosecuted (McKay, 1998, p. 386; Sharratt, 2011, p. ix). 
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2.2 Sexual violence 
The paragraphs above have outlined several factors, most importantly direct violence, that 
have been identified with peacebuilding failure and/or success. As evidenced, however, 
critically missing from the discussion of violence is the distinct phenomenon of wartime 
sexual violence. Sexual violence has been used during war since the earliest historical eras, 
transcending both time and culture (Dillon, 2006, p. 260; Brownmiller, 2013; Farwell, 2004, 
p. 389, 391). Its use stretches as far back as the ancient Romans during the Dacian Wars, to 
most famously the Hutus in the Rwandan Civil War 1990-1994 (Dillon, 2006, p. 260). The 
knowledge of the occurrence of sexual violence during war is not novel, but this topic has 
only recently begun to draw attention in the context of peacebuilding (Farwell, 2004, p. 390). 
Sexual violence, according to Cohen and Nordås (2014, p. 419), is comprised of seven key 
components: (1) sexual slavery, (2) sexual mutilation, (3) sexual torture, (4) rape, (5) forced 
prostitution, (6) forced pregnancy, and finally (7) forced sterilization and/or abortion. This 
definition focuses on actions that include direct force or physical violence, and is gender 
neutral both in regards to sexual violence victims, as well the perpetrators of sexual violence 
(ibid).  
 
Within the sexual violence discourse researches have generally been divided into two areas: 
(a) the motives of wartime sexual violence, particularly rape, and (b) the consequences of 
wartime sexual violence. Historically the narrative of wartime sexual violence, which has 
tended to focus specifically on rape, was one of an unavoidable by-product of conflict; “a 
matter of poor discipline, the inevitable bad behavior of soldiers revved up, needy, and 
briefly out of control” (Copelon, 1995, p. 197). Current approaches have created debate 
within the topic by arguing for a shift in the perception of wartime rape to a planned and 
targeted policy, resulting in discussions of ‘rape as a weapon of war’ (Buss, 2009, p. 145; 
Bergoffen, 2009; Cannon, 2012). This term “provides a way to articulate the systematic, 
pervasive, and orchestrated nature of wartime sexual violence that marks it as integral rather 
than incidental to war” (Buss, 2009, p. 145).  
 
For example, Maedl’s (2011, p. 145) study of the perceptions of Congolese survivors of rape 
identified that rape served a multitude of different purposes including: the displacement of 
communities, installation of fear, transmission of diseases, and impregnation. Salzman (1998, 
p. 349) wrote about the systematically planned and strategically executed use of rape by 
political and military leaders from Serbia for ethnic cleansing with an aim of forming a 
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homogenous Serbian nation with one religion, culture, and language. According to Cohen 
(2013, p. 468) wartime rape also serves the function of galvanizing and socializing soldiers to 
establish a bond between them, as was the case with Guatemalan soldiers during the 
Guatemalan Civil War 1960-1996 (Sanford, Álvarez-Arenas and Dill, 2016 p. 39; Pankhurst, 
2010, p. 152). Research by Cohen (2013, p. 464-465) and Schneider, Banholzer and 
Albarracin (2015, p. 1358) have found that bonding through rape is particularly likely to 
happen in circumstances where the recruitment mechanism was forceful and random – i.e. the 
soldiers were abducted or pressganged. Within these circumstances the social ties and 
cohesions amongst the soldiers are weak, thus participating in the gang rape of a victim 
establishes trust and builds camaraderie that may not otherwise occur spontaneously (Cohen, 
2013, p. 464).  
 
For some authors, however, the occurrence of wartime sexual violence is not a result of 
strategy but rather opportunity (Baaz and Stern, 2009, p. 505; Enloe, 2000, p. 111; Goldstein, 
2001, p. 365-366). During wartime, the societal norms and structures that normally prevent or 
reduce the likelihood of sexual violence from occurring breakdown, and a climate of 
impunity develops (Gerecke, 2010, p. 140; Kearns and Young, 2014, p. 262). Accordingly, 
the setting of war provides an opportunity for perpetrators of sexual violence to transgress 
and act out their previously repressed biologically driven (hetero)sexual needs and urges 
(Baaz and Stern, 2014, p. 586). In line with the biological-impunity argument is the sexual 
gratification reasoning (Al Boukhary, 2017, p. 101). This strand of thought stipulates that war 
prevents men from satisfying their sexual needs that were previously attended to during 
peace; accordingly, they resort to sexual violence (ibid). Though the sexual gratification that 
men seek is partly driven by male biology, it is the socio-cultural notions of masculinity 
primarily push them to commit acts of sexual violence (Brewer, 2010, p. 82). Indeed, the 
association of the vulnerability of women and control over them with the sexual acts 
perpetuates the commitment of wartime sexual violence (ibid). 
 
Related to the opportunism discourse, some authors have propositioned greed as a motive for 
wartime sexual violence (Cohen, 2013, p. 462-463). Weinstein (2007, p. 309) makes a 
distinction between two kinds of armed groups: ‘justice-oriented’ and ‘greed-oriented’. It is 
theorized that the latter, which has access to material resources, attracts a type of people who 
are more prone to violence (Cohen, 2013, p. 462-463). The resulting violence is carried out in 
an indiscriminate and ruthless manner, which then causes civilian populations to fight back in 
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resistance ultimately creating a vicious cycle of repression and resistance (Weinstein, 2007, 
p. 309). Additionally, the organizational structure of this group lacks cohesion and discipline 
thereby permitting the occurrence of this unrestrained violence (Balcells, 2015, 380-381). 
Arguably, the RUF in Sierra Leone are a prime example of a greed-oriented armed group, 
facilitated by external support, which committed mass violence including sexual violence 
(Merger, 2016, p. 104; Duriesmith, 2013, p. 246). 
 
These strands of theory are criticized by feminist literature, which comment on the ignorance 
of structural influences, female perpetrators, and male victims of sexual violence (Henry, 
2005; Ferrales and McElrath, 2014; Al Boukhary, 2017, p. 101; Merger, 2016, p. 6). 
Furthermore, the opportunism discourse perpetuates the view that wartime sexual violence is 
an unfortunate yet unavoidable part of war; which research by Wood (2010) has disputed. 
Whilst acknowledging that wartime sexual violence is widespread and frequent, Wood (2010, 
p. 161) has found the existence of an asymmetrical pattern in the use of sexual violence in 
conflict. Utilizing the secessionist Sri Lankan LTTE as a case study, she investigated why 
there was a comparative lack of sexual violence by this armed group, and found that the 
LTTE military hierarchy had a firm grip on their troops and ensured punishment for 
disobedience of orders (i.e. not to commit sexual violence) (Wood, 2009, p. 131, 152). This 
research signifies that “rape [and consequently sexual violence] is not inevitable in war”, 
thereby reinforcing the efforts made “to end sexual violence and other violations of the laws 
of war” (ibid, p. 153). 
 
Within societies the consequences of wartime sexual violence on victims are evident on the 
micro (individual), meso (communal), macro (national) levels. Indeed, individual victims of 
sexual violence can suffer from a range of sequelae. Wartime sexual violence often results in 
the spread of HIV/AIDS as well as other sexually transmitted diseases (Leaning, Bartels and 
Mowafi, 2009, p. 193). The spread of diseases can also be associated with a number of war-
related factors including, inter alia, population displacement, as was the case in 1987 Angola, 
heightened levels of sexual risk behavior like the El Salvadorian Civil War 1980-1992, or 
purposeful military use similar to the Ugandan Bush War 1981-1986 (Hankins et al., 2002, p. 
2246). Women have been found to disproportionally at risk of contracting diseases as a result 
of wartime sexual violence due to the change in household structure during war (Brouwer, 
2005, p. 34; Barberet, 2014 p. 103). Victims of sexual violence – female and male – suffering 
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from sexually transmitted infections and related diseases often do not seek proper care and 
treatment because of the shame associated with admitting the assault (Kirchner, 2008 p. 21).  
 
Other physical injuries resulting from sexual violence include those inflicted during the 
carrying out of the sexual violence, namely broken bones, head trauma, and lacerations 
(Leaning, Bartels and Mowafi, 2009, p. 192-193). The variety of injuries that victims can 
sustain as a result of wartime sexual violence can impede them from working and gaining 
income after the conflict has ended (Chitsike and Nkuuhe, 2014, p. 48). The physical 
consequences of wartime sexual violence are not limited to the sustaining of injuries and 
frequently culminate in pregnancy and childbirth (Carpenter, 2010, p. 21). These pregnancies 
as Copleon (1994, p. 256) explains, “whether or not aborted, continues [sic] the initial torture 
in a most intimate and invasive form; and the fact of bearing the child of rape, whether or not 
the child is placed for adoption, has a potentially life-long impact on the woman and her 
place in the community”. In turn, those children that are born of wartime sexual victims 
suffer themselves from many of the similar psychological and social consequences that their 
mothers do (Seto, 2013; Denov, 2015).  
 
In addition to affecting the victim’s body through the maiming of the flesh, wartime sexual 
violence can also affect the mind through the maiming of the memory (Denov, 2006, p. 327). 
Psychological consequences might include depression, withdrawal, anxiety, and poor self-
esteem particularly in communities where women’s honor is dependent on sexual purity 
(Leaning, Bartels and Mowafi, 2009, p. 193; Leiby, 2009, p. 451; Kurtz and Diggs, 2015, p. 
191). The societal taboos regarding sexuality often mean that victims suffer in silence (Dossa 
et al., 2014, p. 244). Some victims of sexual violence resort to self-medication through the 
abuse of substances like drugs and alcohol in order to manage these effects (Onyango and 
Hampanda, 2011, p. 243). Adding to these sequelae is the social ostracism suffered by 
individual victims (Harding, 2011, p. 95). The stigma has been found to further aggravate the 
mental health effect of sexual violence as it may lead to depression and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) (Verelst et al., 2014, p. 1139). These psychological consequences pervade 
long after the end of conflict as illustrated by Vinck et al.’s (2007, p. 543) research conducted 
in war-affected Northern Uganda, which found that subjects suffering from symptoms of 
PTSD, as a result of exposure to war crimes, have a higher likelihood of being favor of 
ending the conflict through violence rather than nonviolence. Similarly to the physical 
injuries, the stigmatization of wartime sexual violence victims can result in difficulty of 
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finding employment in post-conflict life (Pagitt et al., 2013, p. 88-89). In some instances, 
both the women who suffered wartime sexual violence and their children turn to the sex trade 
in order to sustain themselves (Dietrich, 2007, p. 266). 
 
Wartime sexual violence also has consequences for victims at the meso-level; whilst 
perpetrators can also suffer consequences, the following discussion focuses only on victims 
(Leiby, 2009, p. 449; Diken and Bagge Laustsen, 2005, p. 111; Cohen, 2013, p. 465). Within 
many communities women are often symbols of culture, and the ability to protect the women 
is associated with that culture’s strength or weakness (Seifert, 1996, p. 39; Kelly, 2010, p. 
122). Women also often hold a role of producing and maintaining family and community 
cohesion (McDevitt-Murphy, Casey, and Cogdal, 2010, p. 293-294). Therefore an attack on 
women is also an attack on the community as a whole, present and future (Dossa et al., 2014, 
p. 241; Diken and Bagge Laustsen, 2005, p. 111). Accordingly, wartime sexual violence has 
the potential to disintegrate an entire community’s social fabric, thereby threatening its 
survival (Leiby, 2009, p. 451). Particularly in ethnic conflicts, sexual violence against women 
resulting in the birth of children of a differing ethnicity can serve to completely negate their 
own identity and consequently that of the community (Barberet, 2014, p. 106; Diken and 
Bagge Laustsen, 2005, p. 111). As Eisenstein (2000, p. 47) explains in the case of the 
Bosnian War 1992-1995, the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims by the Serbs required the 
destruction of Muslim women’s identities. Children born to Serb father and Muslim mothers 
were considered to be purely Serb, thereby negating the women’s identity entirely (ibid). It 
should be noted that communities themselves contribute adversely to sexual violence 
consequences by adhering to and perpetuating norms, values, and beliefs that place the 
culpability on victim rather than perpetrators (Dossa et al., 2014, p. 244, 252). Indeed, the 
victims of sexual violence are deemed soiled and less worthy and often equated to adulterers 
in line with cultural norms valuing purity (ibid). 
 
Whilst the previous paragraphs have predominantly focused on the consequences of wartime 
sexual violence on female victims, male victims also merit attention. The inclusion of men 
and boys in the discourse of sexual violence, particularly in its conceptualization, is a 
relatively new phenomenon (Touquet and Gorris, 2016, p. 36). Little research exists on the 
experiences of male victims of sexual violence primarily “due to under-reporting, lack of 
institutional detection, lack of a legal framework and a narrowed focus on sexual violence 
against women” (Solangon and Patel, 2012, p. 422). Yet, male victims of wartime sexual 
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violence suffer from many of the same physical, psychological, and social consequences as 
female victims (Dennis, 2011, p. 34; Turchik and Edwards, 2012, p. 215). Onyango and 
Hampanda (2011, p. 237, 240) argue that men may suffer even more from these 
consequences than female victims, due to the socio-cultural hegemonic hetero-normative 
values regarding sexuality and masculinity within communities. For example, by having been 
victims of sexual violence by another male, male victims could be stripped of their 
heterosexual identity and presumed homosexual, and accordingly encounter further 
discrimination and/or humiliation from other members of society (Campbell-Ruggaard and 
Van Ryswyk, 2001, p. 294; Jausoro Alzola and Marino, 2015, p. 19; Priddy, 2014, p. 277). 
Furthermore, because of the association of vulnerability with femininity, male victims of 
sexual violence may be denied their masculine statuses in society and deemed frail, 
subservient, and inferior (Gear, 2010, p. 320; Weiss, 2010, p. 277; Javaid, 2016, p. 284). 
Consequently, victimhood and masculinity are deemed incompatible (Priddy, 2015, p. 683). 
Interestingly however, the perspective is reversed when speaking about the perpetrator of 
male-on-male sexual violence – i.e. the heterosexual and masculine identity of male 
perpetrators of sexual violence is actually bolstered (Jones, 2006, p. 459). As Segal (1990, p. 
247) poignantly stated “a male who fucks another male is a double male”.  
 
Finally, the consequences of wartime sexual violence are evident on the macro (national) 
level in fields other than, but strongly linked to, peacebuilding (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 
265; O’Reilly, 2018, p. 66-68). Successful post-conflict peacebuilding is reliant on the 
establishment of democratic and effective state-institutions (Ottaway, 2007). In turn, this is 
dependent on the restoration of trust between the newly created state-institutions and its 
citizens (Kelman, 2005). This is key to the building of sustainable peace, because if citizens 
do not trust state-institutions then the reestablishment of effective state authority and 
accountable governance are weakened (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 266). The trial and 
prosecution of human rights violators is particularly helpful in rebuilding trust in state-
institutions and consequently the rule of law (Özerdem and Lee, 2016, p. 134; Pankhurst, 
2010, p. 151). In post-conflict societies, victims of sexual violence (especially women) often 
feel pressured not to report the crimes committed against them due to stigma, fear, and 
cultural norms, which combined devalue their identities as victims (Pankhurst, 2010, p. 151; 
Jones et al., 2014, p. 5; O’Reilly, 2018, p. 68). Yet it is crucial that transitional justice 
mechanisms provide these victims, regardless of gender, with the avenues to report wartime 
sexual violence and then effectively investigate and prosecute the criminals in order for peace 
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to be reestablished and remain (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 263-266). Indeed, not only will 
the participation of wartime sexual violence victims enable the design and implementation of 
effective measures of delivering justice, it will also (re)affirm the status of survivors as 
crucial actors in the transitional justice process (O’Reilly, 2018, p. 67). Failing to give 
victims the ability to advance justice claims could jeopardize the peacebuilding process by 
harming “the delicate process of instilling a culture of respect for the rule of law” (Jenkins 
and Goetz, 2010, p. 263-266).  
 
Furthermore, the failure to re-instill trust in in the newly created state-institutions may affect 
political and civic participation (Ricigliano, 2016, p. 98; Cox, 2009, p. 23). The participation 
of citizens in all aspects of the peacebuilding process, social and political, is central because 
it helps establish and legitimize democracy (Söderström, 2015, p. 56; Leach, Coxall and 
Robins, 2011, p. 57). Some researchers have even likened the level of citizen participation to 
the quality of democracy (Lijphart, 1999; Vanhanen, 2004). Democracy, in turn, is 
intrinsically linked to peacebuilding, specifically peacebuilding success (Heldt, 2004; 
Ottoway, 2007; Reychler, 2001). Indeed, “democracy is seen as important for universal 
individual rights, but also for generating good governance, which is expected to benefit 
economic growth, improve the efficiency of development aid, and decrease the risks of civil 
conflict”; all of which are crucial for successful peacebuilding (Heldt, 2011, p. 47). 
Moreover, the lack of participation in political and social life has a further ripple effect of 
perpetuating gender inequality in post-conflict societies (Olsson and Gizelis, 2015, p. 5). 
Equality in society and politics requires the active participation of all citizens (Porter, 2007, 
p. 191). Successful peacebuilding in particular, has been shown to necessitate the inclusion of 
women in political and economic decision-making (Gizelis, 2011, p. 522, 525; Gizelis, 2009, 
p. 509; Väyrynen, 2010, p. 142). The international community took note of this importance 
when it passed UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000, p. 1) reaffirming the importance of women in 
the peacebuilding process. This has been proven in cases like Sierra Leone where the status 
of women in post-conflict reconstruction was found to have a positive effect on 
peacebuilding success (Gizelis, 2011, p. 538).  
 
As the previous paragraphs have outlined, wartime sexual violence has consequences that 
continue to affect victims and communities on the micro, meso, and macro levels even after 
the conflict has ended. For example, a victim of wartime sexual violence may have difficulty 
finding a job due to the social ostracism they experience at the hand of their community, 
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which in turn disintegrates the societal fabric (Pagitt et al., 2013, p. 88-89; Leiby, 2009, p. 
451). They may also feel unable to report the crime committed against them to the authorities 
because of the feeling of shame, thereby causing their perpetrator to not be prosecuted and 
thusly weakening their trust with the state (Pankhurst, 2010, p. 151; Özerdem and Lee, 2016, 
p. 134). Evidently, the interplay of the consequences on all three levels is likely to affect the 
peacebuilding process and failure to address them will affect the three indispensable 
components of successful peacebuilding: social stability, economic recovery, and effective 
state authority (Jenkins and Goetz, 2010, p. 265). As the current UN Secretary-General 
(UNSG) stated: “For peacebuilding and reconciliation to take root, justice must be done, and 
be seen to be done, for sexual violence survivors. Otherwise, the trauma, disease, perceived 
dishonour, and desire for vengeance will fester within communities” (Guterres, 2017, p. 7).  
 
H1: the higher the prevalence of wartime sexual violence, the lower the probability of 
successful peacebuilding. 
 
Chapter 3. Research Design 
3.1 Methodology 
This research employs a mix-methods research strategy, merging both quantitative and 
qualitative methods for the purposes of complementarity (Lamont, 2015, p. 115). Firstly, I 
begin by conducting a quantitative large-N observational study on cross-sectional data. Doing 
so enables me to determine if the distribution of the outcome conforms to the pattern of the 
theory – higher prevalence of wartime sexual violence lower the probability of successful 
peacebuilding – and if any correlations can be estimated between the variables under 
investigation from the patterns of variation. To complement the research findings from the 
large-N study, a brief deviant case study is also conducted. “Deviant case study research 
designs focus on observed empirical anomalies in existing theoretical propositions, with the 
aim of explaining why the case deviates from theoretical expectations and in the process 
refining the existing theory and generating additional hypotheses.” (Levy, 2008, p. 3). 
Deviant case studies are particularly suitable in tandem to quantitative research “since the 
most significant deviations from the regression line in a statistical analysis are ideal cases for 
selection for more thorough examination by case studies” (ibid, p. 13). By refining the theory 
through the identification of previously omitted variables, researchers aim to generate a new 
hypothesis that can be applied to and explain other deviant cases, eventually resulting in a 
general proposition (Gerring, 2017, p. 77; George and Bennett, 2004, p. 111). Thus, the 
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analysis of deviant case studies can actually improve theoretical propositions that inform 
typical case studies (Rubin and Babbie, 2010, p. 148; Orvis and Drogus, 2015, p. 10). 
However, it should be noted that the analysis of a deviant case study might conclude that said 
deviant case does not contravene the established theory (Levy, 2008, p. 3). Indeed, as 
Alexander Jr. (2010, p. 76) contends, one single case may not provide enough proof to 
repudiate a theory.  
 
The cross-sectional data that is analyzed as part of the quantitative large-N study is derived 
from a newly created data set. The newly created data set merges information provided by the 
Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) database, created by Cohen and Nordås (2014), 
the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, the Polity IV Project (2016), and finally the World Bank 
(2018). It consists of 51 conflicts, the observational unit of analysis, during the period of 
1989-2009. The three different types of conflicts included within this research are derived 
from Cohen and Nordås’ (2014) SVAC database. These include, “(1) Intrastate armed 
conflict, which occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition 
groups without intervention from other states; (2) Internationalized internal armed conflict, 
which occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups 
with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides; and (3) Interstate 
conflicts, which occurs between the governments of two states” (Cohen and Nordås, 2013, p. 
5-6).  
 
3.2 Dependent variable  
The dependent variable that is measured is the ‘peacebuilding outcome’ of each conflict. The 
conceptualization and operationalization of the success or failure of peacebuilding efforts is 
inspired by work from Doyle and Sambanis (2000). In their research of 125 civil wars from 
1944-1997, these authors used the outcome of three intermediate variables, namely, end of 
war, no residual violence, and democracy, to construct a lenient and strict definition of 
peacebuilding success or failure two and five years after the end of each conflict (ibid, p. 783, 
798). Specific information on the coding guideline for their dependent peacebuilding variable 
is available in appendix C of their article (ibid).  
 
For this research, basing myself off the work of Doyle and Sambanis’ (2000), I construct my 
own dependent variable using the outcome of two intermediate variables: recurrence of 
violence and democracy. These intermediate variables are the same as two of three 
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intermediate variables Doyle and Sambanis (2000, p. 798) used in the construction of their 
dependent variable; however the information for them stems from different sources to those 
used by Doyle and Sambanis (ibid). Specifically, information for the recurrence of violence 
comes from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and information for democracy comes from the 
Polity IV Project (2016). Similarly to Doyle and Sambanis (ibid) I construct the 
‘peacebuilding outcome’ variable within a 2 and 5-year period following the end of each 
conflict; however, unlike Doyle and Sambanis (ibid) the threshold for determining 
peacebuilding success remains the same for both time periods. Hence I create a dependent 
variable with two different time variations, which strengthens the robustness of the 
quantitative study because it evidences whether the passage of time impacts the outcome of 
the intermediate variables, and hence the peacebuilding outcome variable. In this research, 
the construction of the dependent variable ‘peacebuilding outcome’ is done in the following 
four steps, as inspired by Doyle and Sambanis (ibid). 
 
Step 1: Determine the ‘end date’ of each conflict. The ‘end date’ of each conflict signifies the 
first year that a peacebuilding attempt was made, marked by the signing of a final agreement 
or accords by the warring parties rather than ceasefire agreements. Indeed, “in the context of 
liberal peacebuilding, sources of declared intentions are collective intentions prescribed in 
peace agreements, UN resolutions, and other policy documents, which constitute their 
ideological bedrock and represent the reference point against which peacebuilding 
performativity takes place” (Visoka, 2016, p. 54). Note that some conflicts can have multiple 
peacebuilding attempts but this research only focuses on the first attempt. Research on each 
individual conflict was done using the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and from there the ‘end 
date’ was determined. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia was chosen as the source for this 
step because the conflicts included in SVAC database also stem from the UCDP.  
 
Step 2. Was there a recurrence of violence within the 2-year period following the ‘end date’ 
of each conflict? If no, code recurrence2 as 0, if yes code recurrence2 as 1. Was there a 
recurrence of violence within the 5-year period following the end of each conflict? If no, 
code recurrence5 as 0, if yes code recurrence5 as 1. To determine if violence recurred post 
‘end date’ for each conflict, the UCDP threshold of 25 battle deaths or more per year was 
used.  
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Step 3: What was the level of democratization of the territory in which the conflict was 
fought 2 years following the ‘end date’ of each conflict? What was the level of 
democratization of the territory in which the conflict was fought 5 years following the ‘end 
date’ of each conflict? The source for this comes from the Polity IV Project (2016). For 
example the Rwandan Civil War (conflict ID 179) has an ‘end date’ of 1993 when the Arusha 
Accords were signed; accordingly the Polity score for Rwanda in 1995 (dem2) and 1998 
(dem5) respectively are recorded. The territory in which each conflict was fought is 
determined by the variable ‘GWNO’ (Gleditsch/Ward country ID) in the SVAC database. In 
cases where a conflict had multiple territories recorded, the mode territory was used.  
 
It should be noted that the specific variable used within the Polity IV Project (2016) to 
determine the level of democratization was the ‘POLITY2’ variable. The ‘POLITY2’ 
variable “is a modified version of the POLITY variable… [that] modifies the combined 
annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or ‘fix’, to convert instances of 
‘standardized authority scores’ (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., 
within the range, -10 to +10)” (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2017, p. 17). However, in cases 
where the authority score of the POLITY variable was -66, this was then treated as missing 
information within the Polity IV Project (2016) (ibid). Accordingly, within the newly created 
data of this research that sources information from the ‘POLITY2’ variable, some conflicts 
have missing information on the level of democratization. Consequently, the peacebuilding 
variable becomes skewed in conflicts with missing information on the level of 
democratization, because the peacebuilding variable becomes reliant only on the recurrence 
of violence. Despite this, the data set still includes the conflicts with missing information on 
the level of democratization in order to not further reduce the number of observations.  
 
Step 4: Peacebuilding outcome within a 2-year period following the ‘end date’ of each 
conflict is coded as 1 (successful) if: recurrence2 = 0, and dem2 ≥ 6. Otherwise, pb2 is coded 
as 0 (failure). Peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period following the ‘end date’ of each 
conflict is coded as 1 (successful) if: recurrence5 = 0, and dem5 ≥ 6. Otherwise, pb5 is coded 
as 0 (failure). A threshold of 6 or higher is used as an indicator for high level of democracy 
because, as indicated by the Polity IV Project (2016), “scores can also be converted into 
regime categories in a suggested three part categorization of ‘autocracies’ (-10 to -6), 
‘anocracies’ (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88), and ‘democracies’ (+6 to 
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+10)”. Given that the dependent variable of interest is binary, the hypothesis is tested through 
the use of logistic regressions.  
 
3.3 Independent variable 
The main independent variable of interest is the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. The 
SVAC database uses three different sources, namely, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, and the US State Department, to provide measurements on this variable (Cohen and 
Nordås, 2014, p. 421). The variable “captures the reported severity of [wartime] sexual 
violence perpetration by an armed actor in a given year” per conflict for each of the three 
sources (ibid, p. 419). Accordingly, this research uses the highest level of sexual violence 
reported by any of the groups for any year per conflict across all three sources. Recall that 
each conflict is assigned an ‘end date’ signifying the first year that a peacebuilding attempt 
was made. Thus, this research calculates the highest level of reported sexual violence for 
each conflict up to and including that ‘end date’ and ignore the following years (given that 
they surpass the ‘peacebuilding moment’). For more information on how this variable is 
measured see table 1 on page 26. 
 
3.4 Control variables 
Due to the limited number of observations, this research utilizes only two control variables. 
As Strickland (2017, p. 43) and others explain, there is typically a recommended ratio of 10 
cases per independent variable in order to increase the accuracy of the statistical analysis 
(Warner, 2013, p. 1034; Mertler and Reinhart, 2017, p. 311). Leech, Barrett and Morgan 
(2015, p. 167) recommend as many as 20 cases per independent variable. Whilst Warner 
(2013, p. 1034) explains that factors other than the number of cases can impact the statistical 
power in multivariate analyses – including the correlation between independent variables and 
the level of association between each independent variable and the dependent variable – it 
was nonetheless decided to only use two control variables to increase the statistical accuracy.  
 
The control variables that are included in the statistical analysis are ‘targeting of victims’ and 
the net official development assistance (ODA) received per capita (current US$). ‘Targeting 
of victims’ refers to whether the sexual violence experienced during each individual conflict 
was selective (i.e. against particular groups) or random (Cohen and Nordås, 2014, p. 420). 
The SVAC database provides measurements on this variable for each armed actor engaged in 
a conflict in a particular year. It is coded as follows: 0 signifies that the wartime sexual 
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violence was not used selectively while 1 signifies it was (Cohen and Nordås, 2013, p.12). 
Accordingly, this research uses the overall mean of the targeting of victims per conflict. The 
net ODA received per capita (current US$), which stems from the World Bank (2018), refers 
to the amount of net ODA per capita the territory in which the conflict was fought received 
on the ‘end date’ of each conflict. These two independent or control variables were chosen 
because Doyle and Sambanis’ (2000, p. 786) research found that similar variables were 
shown to be significant in either increasing or decreasing the likelihood of peacebuilding 
success. Specifically, their research showed – both in the strict and lenient models of 
peacebuilding – that higher levels of the variable “net current transfers per capita” increase 
the likelihood of successful peacebuilding whilst “identity wars” lower it (ibid, p. 786-787).  
 
3.5 Potential deviant case study 
The chosen deviant case study that complements the large-N observational study is 
determined by the results of the latter. This is because the aim of deviant case studies is to 
test theory by examining a case that does not conform to the expected pattern (Moses and 
Knutsen, 2007, p. 133). For example, if the large-N study confirms the current hypothesis – 
the higher the prevalence of wartime sexual violence, the lower the probability of successful 
peacebuilding – then a potential deviant case study could be the Bosnian War (1992-1995); 
which had massive reports of wartime sexual violence yet has remained at peace since the 
signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 
(Amnesty International, 2017). Potential data sources for the analysis of the deviant case 
study include: journal articles, newspapers, reports, and surveys. 
 
3.6 Limitations of data set and research strategy 
The SVAC database originally includes 129 conflicts. This research only includes 51 of those 
129 conflicts for two reasons. Firstly, a number of the conflicts have not had any 
peacebuilding attempts and therefore cannot be used for the purposes of this research. 
Secondly, the SVAC database ends in 2009 yet a number of the conflicts had peacebuilding 
attempts after that date. In the latter case, those conflicts were also excluded because the 
information on the prevalence of wartime sexual violence is incomplete; thusly the full extent 
of the impact of wartime sexual violence on peacebuilding efforts cannot be accurately 
measured. It is unfortunately not possible to code the prevalence of wartime sexual violence 
for the conflicts that had peacebuilding attempts after 2009, because the SVAC database 
(which codes prevalence categorically) does not indicate how many acts of sexual violence 
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they consider to fit into the categories. Additionally, by choosing to aggregate the data and 
change the unit of observation from conflict-actor-year in the SVAC database to simply 
conflict, further data was lost.  
 
As a consequence of having a limited number of observations within the data set, any results 
and conclusions drawn from the analyses of the logistic regression are tenuous. Importantly, 
when analyzing and discussing the results the term ‘correlation’ rather than ‘causation’ must 
be employed. Indeed, the phrase ‘correlation does not imply causation’ is crucial in any 
social science research but particularly so in cases with a small data set (Fiedler and Kareev, 
2008, p. 153). As McKillup (2005, p. 28) explains, “the correlation may have occurred by 
chance, or a third unmeasured factor might determine the numbers of the variables studied”. 
Furthermore, a small data set also poses problems for the generalizability of the inferences 
made (Druckman, 2005, p. 41). This is because the data set may be bias due to missing 
information that could impact the outcome of the statistical analysis (Vogt, 2007, p. 176-
179). Similarly, the data may be bias due to overrepresentation (Engel and Schutt, 2012, p. 
452). In casu, the newly created data set analyzed in the large-N study is geographically 
concentrated in Africa with 26 of the 51 conflicts located in that continent. As depicted in 
figure 1 on page 25, the conflicts located within the African territory had particularly high 
levels of wartime sexual violence; thereby potentially skewing the data. Though the inclusion 
of two control variables mitigates in part for omitted variable bias, it does not eliminate it 
entirely. Undeniably, as Menard (2002, p. 69) states, the research could “have failed to 
identify all of the relevant predictors or causes of a dependent variable, or because 
theoretically relevant variables have been omitted”. 
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Figure 1: Map of conflict territories included in the dataset with their highest level of 
reported wartime sexual violence 
	
Source: created by the author with the use of Tableau Public 
 
This research includes three types of conflicts: intrastate armed conflict, internationalized 
internal armed conflict, and interstate conflicts. All three types of conflicts are included 
within the data set in order to not further diminish the number of observations. This decision, 
however, may impact the outcome of the results. As aforementioned, some research affirms 
that the type of conflict impacts peacebuilding efforts (Gartner, 2012, p. 72-73; Paris, 2016, 
p. 510). Indeed, Gartner (2012, p. 72-73) explains that the comparative difficulty of resolving 
intrastate wars is much higher than interstate wars due to: significant power asymmetries, 
status difference, and zero-sum issues. Paris (2016, p. 510) concurs with this line of argument 
by citing that civil wars have a higher likelihood of conflict resurgence in comparison to 
interstate wars, as evidenced by ‘repeat civil war’ being the most recurrent type of conflict.  
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Table 1. Data set overview 
Variable Measurement Source(s) 
Dependent Peacebuilding outcome 
Qualitative categorical dummy; 
peacebuilding outcome within a 2 and 5-year 
period following the ‘end date’ of each 
conflict 
0 = failure 
1 = success 
UCDP 
Conflict 
Encyclopedia 
Polity IV 
Project (2016) 
Independent 
Prevalence of 
wartime sexual 
violence 
Qualitative categorical variable 
0 = no reports of sexual violence 
1 = isolated reports of sexual violence 
2 = numerous reports of sexual violence 
3 = massive reports of sexual violence 
Cohen and 
Nordås (2014) 
Targeting of 
victims 
Quantitative interval variable  
ranging from 0 to 0.25 
Cohen and 
Nordås (2014) 
The net ODA 
received per 
capita (current 
US$) 
Quantitative interval variable  
ranging from 0 to 251.27 
The World 
Bank (2018) 
 
Chapter 4. Quantitative Large-N Study 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and graphs 
Table 2 below shows the information for the two variants of the dependent variable and the 
three independent variables in the dataset. The bar charts 1, 2, and 3 on page 27 graphically 
depict the descriptive statistics for the two variants of the dependent variable and the main 
independent variable respectively. The mean of 0.33 for the peacebuilding outcome within a 
2-year period signifies that approximately 33% of the conflicts had a successful 
peacebuilding outcome; whereas approximately 37% of the conflicts had a successful 
peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period. With a mean of 1.27, most conflicts 
experienced isolated levels of wartime sexual violence. Targeting of victims has a mean of 
0.06, a value extremely close to 0 thereby signifying that the wartime sexual violence was not 
used selectively in most conflicts. A do-file containing information on how to replicate all of 
the tables in chapter 4 is available upon request. Note that all values in the tables in chapter 4 
have been rounded to the nearest second decimal place to improve legibility. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Number of  observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Peacebuilding 2-year 51 0.33 0.48 0 1 
Peacebuilding 5-year 51 0.37 0.49 0 1 
Prevalence 51 1.27 1.04 0 3 
Targeting 51 0.06 0.08 0 0.25 
Net ODA per capita 51 42.19 45.68 0 251.27 
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If any of the predictors used in the analysis had collinearity then they would need to be 
excluded from the research (Kleinbaum et al., 2014, p. 371). However, as shown in tables 3 
and 4 below, none of the correlation coefficients arrive at the absolute value of 1; accordingly 
the three explanatory variables are retained.  
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for 2-year period 
 Peacebuilding 2-year Prevalence Targeting 
ODA per 
capita 
Peacebuilding 2-year 1.0000    
Prevalence 0.0538 1.0000   
Targeting 0.0840 0.3365 1.0000  
Net ODA per capita 0.1186 0.2394 0.1608 1.0000 
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix for 5-year period 
 Peacebuilding 5-year Prevalence Targeting 
ODA per 
capita 
Peacebuilding 5-year 1.0000    
Prevalence -0.0478 1.0000   
Targeting -0.0208 0.3365 1.0000  
Net ODA per capita 0.0516 0.2394 0.1608 1.0000 
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4.2 Simple logistic regressions 
A simple logistic regression is run to initially establish the association between the 
prevalence of wartime sexual violence and peacebuilding outcome. Tables 5 and 6 on pages 
28 and 29 show the results for the 2 and 5-year periods of the dependent variable 
respectively. Accordingly, logit models for each simple logistic regression are created. Both 
logit models are written in terms of the log of odds and can be found in the appendix on page 
46.  
 
Table 5. Simple logistic regression for 2-year period 
Peacebuilding 2-year Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Prevalence 0.11 (0.29) 
Constant -0.84 (0.48) 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0023 
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.39 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
The simple logistic regression for the 2-year period shows a b > 0, indicating that – holding 
other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period 
increases when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases. Expressing the logit 
model in terms of probabilities allows for the prediction of successful peacebuilding within a 
2-year period depending on the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. See the appendix on 
page 46 for the formula. 
 
It is predicted that the probability of peacebuilding success within a 2-year period if a conflict 
had isolated levels of wartime sexual violence equals approximately 33%. Conversely if a 
conflict had massive levels of wartime sexual violence, it is predicted that the probability of 
peacebuilding success within a 2-year period equals approximately 38%. Overall, the 
probability of peacebuilding success within a 2-year period increases by 5 percentage points 
when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases. 
 
However, a z-value of 0.38 signifies that at a 5% significance level (95% confidence level) 
the null hypothesis fails to be rejected because z falls within the critical values of -2 and 2 
and p (0.701) is greater than 0.05. This finding is further confirmed given that the confidence 
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intervals include 0; meaning that the prevalence of wartime sexual violence could have no 
effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 2-year period. Furthermore, the strength of 
association between these two variables is insubstantial as indicated by the pseudo r-squared 
value of 0.0023. See appendix on page 46 for a table showing the strength of association 
coefficient of determination and a full version of table 5. 
 
Table 6. Simple logistic regression for 5-year period 
Peacebuilding 5-year Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Prevalence -0.10 (0.28) 
Constant -0.40 (0.46) 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0017 
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.62 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
The simple logistic regression for the 5-year period shows a b < 0, indicating that – holding 
other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period 
decreases when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases. Expressing the logit 
model in terms of probabilities allows for the prediction of successful peacebuilding within a 
5-year period depending on the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. See the appendix on 
page 46 for the formula. 
 
It is predicted that the probability of peacebuilding success within a 5-year period if a country 
had isolated levels of wartime sexual violence equal approximately 38%. Conversely if a 
country had massive levels of wartime sexual violence, it is predicted that the probability of 
peacebuilding success within a 5-year period equal approximately 33%. Overall, the 
probability of peacebuilding success within a 5-year period decreases by 5 percentage points 
when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases. 
 
However, a z-value of -0.34 signifies that at a 5% significance level (95% confidence level) 
the null hypothesis fails to be rejected because z falls within the critical values of -2 and 2 
and p (0.733) is greater than 0.05. This finding is further confirmed given that the confidence 
intervals include 0; meaning that the prevalence of wartime sexual violence could have no 
effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period. Furthermore, the strength of 
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association between these two variables is insubstantial as indicated by the pseudo r-squared 
value of 0.0017. See appendix on page 47 for a full version of table 6. 
 
4.3 Multivariate logistic regressions 
The simple logistic regressions, as shown in tables 5 and 6, for the 2 and 5-year period 
explain 0.23% and 0.17% respectively of the variation in peacebuilding outcome. Accordingly, 
the control variables ‘targeting of victims’ and the net ODA received per capita (current US$) 
are added into the analysis to account for competing explanations of variation in 
peacebuilding outcome. The results for the two different time variations are presented in 
tables 7 and 8 on pages 30 and 31 respectively. 
 
Table 7. Multivariate logistic regression for 2-year period 
Peacebuilding 2-year Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Prevalence 0.01 (0.31) 
Targeting 1.78 (4.12) 
Net ODA per capita 0.005 (0.007) 
Constant -1.03 (0.53) 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0140 
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.01 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
The multivariate logistic regression for the 2-year period explains 1.4% of the variation in 
peacebuilding outcome; a 1.17 percentage point increase from the simple logistic regression 
model for the 2-year period. Similarly to the simple logistic regression model for the 2-year 
period, table 7 shows a b > 0 for the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. The same holds 
true for the two control variables ‘targeting of victims’ and the net ODA received per capita 
(current US$). Accordingly, this result indicates that – when holding other variables constant 
– the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period increases when the 
prevalence of wartime sexual violence, selective targeting of victims, and the net ODA 
received per capita (current US$) increase.  
 
However, the independent and control variables in the multivariate logistic regression for the 
2-year period have z-values that fall within the critical values of -2 and 2. Additionally, all of 
	 31 
the p-values are greater than 0.05. This signifies that at a 95% confidence level (a 5% 
significance level) the null hypothesis fails to be rejected. This finding is further confirmed 
given that all of the confidence intervals include 0; meaning that each one of the independent 
and control variables could have no effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 2-year period. 
See appendix on page 47 for a full version of table 7. 
 
By expressing the logit model for the multivariate logistic regression for 2-year period in 
terms of probabilities, we can predict the probability of peacebuilding success if conflict A 
had: (1) massive levels of wartime sexual violence, (2) predominantly selective targeting of 
victims, and (3) received a net ODA per capita of 10 US$.  
 𝑝 𝑦 = 1 =  !"# (!!.!"!!.!"(!)!!.!"(!.!)!!.!!"(!"))!"# !!.!"!!.!"(!)!!.!"(!.!)!!.!!"(!") !! ≈ 58%	
 
Given the aforementioned information, it is predicted that probability of peacebuilding 
success within a 2-year period for Conflict A equals approximately 58%. 
 
Table 8. Multivariate logistic regression for 5-year period 
Peacebuilding 5-year Coef. (Std. Err.) 
Prevalence -0.12 (0.31) 
Targeting -0.31 (4.12) 
Net ODA per capita 0.003 (0.007) 
Constant -0.48 (0.50) 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0050 
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.51 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
The multivariate logistic regression for the 5-year period explains 0.5% of the variation in 
peacebuilding outcome; a 0.33 percentage point increase from the simple logistic regression 
model for the 5-year period. Similarly to the simple logistic regression model for the 5-year 
period, table 8 shows a b < 0 for the prevalence of wartime sexual violence. The same holds 
true for the variable ‘targeting of victims’ but not the net ODA received per capita (current 
US$). Accordingly, this result indicates that – when holding other variables constant – the 
probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period decreases when the prevalence 
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of wartime sexual violence and selective targeting of victims increase. However, the 
probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period increases when the net ODA 
received per capita (current US$) increases, holding other variables constant.  
 
However, the independent and control variables in the multivariate logistic regression for the 
5-year period have z-values that fall within the critical values of -2 and 2. Additionally, all of 
the p-values are greater than 0.05. This signifies that at a 95% confidence level (a 5% 
significance level) the null hypothesis fails to be rejected. This finding is further confirmed 
given that all of the confidence intervals include 0; meaning that each one of the independent 
and control variables could have no effect on peacebuilding outcome within a 5-year period. 
See appendix on page 47 for a full version of table 8. 
 
By expressing the logit model for the multivariate logistic regression for 5-year period in 
terms of probabilities, we can predict the probability of peacebuilding success if conflict A 
had: (1) massive levels of wartime sexual violence, (2) predominantly selective targeting of 
victims, and (3) received a net ODA per capita of 10 US$.  
 𝑝 𝑦 = 1 =  !"# (−0.48!−0.12(!)!−0.31(!.!)!0.003(!"))!"# −0.48!−0.12(!)!−0.31(!.!)!0.003(!") !! ≈ 26%	
 
Given the aforementioned information, it is predicted that probability of peacebuilding 
success within a 5-year period for Conflict A equals approximately 26%.  
 
4.4 Analysis of the simple and multivariate logistic regressions 
In both the simple and multivariate logistic regression models for the 2-year period the results 
suggest that – holding other variables constant – the probability of successful peacebuilding 
within a 2-year period increases when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases. 
Conversely, in both the simple and multivariate logistic regression models for the 5-year 
period the results imply that – holding other variables constant – the probability of successful 
peacebuilding within a 5-year period decreases when the prevalence of wartime sexual 
violence increases. These findings were illustrated through the example of Conflict A whose 
probability of peacebuilding success diminished by just over half from 58% within a 2-year 
period, to 26% within a 5-year period – holding all other variables constant. These results 
suggest that the lapse of time following the end of a conflict may have an impact on 
peacebuilding outcome. Sambanis (2008, p. 30) reached a similar conclusion in his study on 
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UN peace operations, which comprise a key component of peacebuilding efforts. 
Specifically, he found that “UN missions have a robust positive effect on peacebuilding 
outcomes, particularly participatory peace, but the effects occur mainly in the short run” 
(ibid).  
 
Arguably, peacebuilding efforts are more likely to be successful in the short-term rather than 
in the long-term (Quarantelli’s, 1988, p. 16). Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of a conflict 
there tends to be a strong desire for peace within society that has grown fatigued of war 
(Ward and Perrottet, 2013, p. 58; Voorhoeve, 2007, p. 53). Additionally, if a conflict has 
garnered international attention the campaign for peace is extended outside of the conflict 
borders – often evidenced through stickers, slogan t-shirts, and the modern day ‘hasthtags’ on 
Twitter – and pressure mounts on the belligerents to build and sustain peace, at least in the 
short-term (Lötter, 1997, p. 105). These conditions can help foster the implementation of 
transitional justice mechanisms that are necessary for peace and reconciliation to consolidate, 
particularly in conflicts that experienced war crimes (of which wartime sexual violence is a 
component) (Futamura, 2014, p. 23; United Nations, 2018). Against this backdrop victims of 
wartime sexual violence may find themselves encouraged to come forward and seek 
reparations that, especially when done early stages, will promote sustainable peace through 
the reinforcement of trust and accountability between the victims and the state (García-
Godos, 2015, p. 341). Accordingly, the logic follows that if a conflict had high levels of 
wartime sexual violence, peacebuilding success would be more likely particularly in the 
initial post-conflict years. 
 
However, as Quarantelli’s (1988, p. 16) remarks: “while there often is a period of high 
solidarity, morale and consensus immediately after a disaster, as time passes, new 
disagreements and conflicts generated by the relief effort as well as pre-impact group, 
organizational and community differences, cleavages and hostilities, will all surface again”. 
Indeed, if the peacebuilding efforts of transitional justice mechanisms are not supported and 
sustained with the passing of time then in the long-term lasting peace will not be secure 
(Davidian and Kenney, 2017, p. 185); thereby reflecting the results of the 5-year logistic 
regression models. Moreover, short-term needs and objectives of peacebuilding efforts may 
potentially contravene long-term goals (Kühne, 2001, p. 383). Kühne (2001, p. 383) cites a 
key example of this as the disarmament of combatants to prevent violence resurgence and the 
necessity for long-term reintegration into working society. Ultimately, the initial post-conflict 
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period is a ‘window of opportunity’ for peacebuilding efforts to create and foster the 
conditions for sustainable peace (Byrd, 2008, p. 82). During this time it is critical that 
countries “develop institutions and policies that generate economic growth” which will not 
only contribute to sustainable peace but democracy as well (Sambanis, 2008, p. 9, 31).  
 
The variable ‘targeting of victims’ follows the same pattern as the prevalence of wartime 
sexual violence within the different time periods. That is, when holding other variables 
constant, the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period increases when 
the selective targeting of victims increases. Yet, when holding other variables constant, the 
probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year period decreases when the selective 
targeting of victims increases. If the sexual violence experienced during a conflict is selective 
(i.e. against particular groups) this can be indicative of so-called ‘identity wars’ – i.e. wars 
with religious and ethnic origins (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 783). The salience of ethno-
cultural identities between and amongst groups has often been linked to the origins and 
intractability of conflicts (Gurr, 2007, p. 136). If communal groups perceive that they are at a 
comparative disadvantage from others due to their shared identity then they are likely to start 
defining “their interests in ethno-cultural terms” and mobilize in order to “seek gains or 
redress of [the perceived] grievances for their collectivity” (ibid, p. 137-140). However, the 
impact of ethno-cultural identities can also be found later in the conflict cycle in the post-
conflict phase, because how ethno-cultural identities are treated during the peacebuilding 
process has the potential to impact the likelihood of its success (Kaye and Béland, 2009). 
Whilst differences and grievances amongst belligerents may initially be set aside in the 
aftermath of a conflict, if those involved in the peacebuilding process fail to de-politicize 
ethno-cultural identities in the long-term by creating new relationships not based on ethnic 
solidarity, then the reconciliation of differences becomes harder and the likelihood of war 
resurgence increases (ibid, p. 191; Kaufman, 1996).  
 
Interestingly, the effect of the net ODA received per capita (current US$) on peacebuilding 
success remained consistent across the multivariate logistic regression models for the 2 and 5 
year-periods. That is, the results show that within both a 2 and 5-year period the probability 
of successful peacebuilding increases when the net ODA received per capita (current US$) 
increases. In this research the net ODA received per capita (current US$) acted as a proxy for 
‘international capacities’, similarly to Doyle and Sambanis’ (2000, p. 783, 788) research that 
used the net current account transfers per capita (current US$). International capacities are 
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essentially the involvement from the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding 
through financial assistance and/or peace operations (ibid, p. 782-783). The (high) level of 
international capacity available to a post-conflict country is regarded as one of the key 
determinants of successful peacebuilding (Groß, 2017, p. 20; Dobbins et al., 2007, p. xxii).  
 
More specifically for peace operations, it is the mandates that reflect the level of strength and 
commitment to peacebuilding (Sambanis, 2008, p. 14). Peace operations that are 
multidimensional in nature – i.e. “with extensive civilian functions, including economic 
reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight” – have the highest likelihood of 
improving peacebuilding success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 791). Mandate 
effectiveness, however, is contingent upon adequate resource allocation (Holt and Boucher, 
2011, p. 29). Restricting the resources of UN operations can severely hinder the 
implementation of peace accords and weaken the peacebuilding process as a whole, 
potentially leading to war resurgence, as was the case with UNAMIR in 1993 Rwanda 
(Caplan, 2007, p. 26; Bellamy, 2015, p. 52).  
 
Aid in the form of financial assistance also greatly increases the probability of peacebuilding 
success (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, p. 786). In a post-conflict environment, financial 
assistance supports the transitions to liberal democracy, promotes security, and assists social 
and economic development (von der Schulenburg, 2017, p. 39; Groß, 2017, p. 44). 
Importantly, when giving financial assistance to post-conflict societies it is essential that local 
grassroots communities be involved in tandem with non-governmental organizations and 
governments in the creation of “funding categories that are related to a new vision of thinking 
and peace building [sic]” (Byrne, 2009, p. 121; Patrick, 2001, p. 49). However, there is a 
crucial caveat to the relationship between financial assistance and peacebuilding. Prior to the 
reduction of foreign financial assistance, countries must ensure the development of local 
human resources that maintain policies initiated under national development strategies in 
order to prolong peace (Filipov, 2006, p. 7-8; OECD, 2011, p. 86). 
 
It is important to note that the above results, and the inferences drawn from them, are tenuous 
at best. None of the logistic regressions that were run showed any significance at any level. 
The insubstantial pseudo r-squares also highlight the inability of all the models to explain the 
variation in peacebuilding outcome. The lack of statistical significance is in part due to the 
limited number of observations that were included in this research (Finkelstein and Levin, 
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2001, p. 376). Accordingly claiming correlation, let alone causation, between the prevalence 
of wartime sexual violence and peacebuilding outcome is highly questionable.  
 
Chapter 5. Deviant Case Study 
5.1 Justification of chosen deviant case study 
Following the results of the quantitative large-N study, the deviant case study briefly detailed 
in this chapter is the Bosnian War (1992-1995). The Bosnian War was chosen because there 
were massive levels of sexual violence, particularly rape, that were committed in a systematic 
and strategic manner (McDevitt-Murphy, Casey and Cogdal, 2010, p. 293; Seto, 2013, p. 31). 
The acts of sexual violence were predominantly targeted against Bosnian Muslim women 
with a goal to ethnically cleanse the territory and create a homogenous Serbian nation 
(Helms, 2013, p. 3; Salzman, 1998, p. 349). Despite this, since the signing the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 – commonly referred to 
as the Dayton Agreement – Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained at relatively stable and at 
peace; thereby contracting the results from the large-N observational research which found 
that the probability of peacebuilding success decreases as more time passes following the end 
of a conflict (Morus, 2016, p. xliv; Pugh, 2001, p. 195). Given that the Bosnian War deviates 
from the expected pattern of theory established – i.e. the peacebuilding efforts proved 
successful in both the short and long-term rather than only in the immediate post-war years – 
analyzing this case could reveal information that will help refine the theory of the 
relationship between wartime sexual violence and peacebuilding outcome (Axinn and Pearce, 
2006, p. 88).  
 
5.2 The Bosnian War (1992-1995) 
In order to better understand what makes the Bosnian War a unique deviant case we must 
first establish the historical background of Bosnia and Herzegovina so as to provide context 
for the succession of developments throughout the conflict. Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
originally one of six constituent republics of a country known as the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (see figure 2 on page 37 for a map), which was formed in 1918 out of 
the Kingdom of Serbia and the Slavic regions of the dissolved Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(Skutsch, 2005, p. 1325). Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious conglomerate 
under the communist leadership of Jozef Broz Tito (Kubicek, 2016, p. 56; Amstutz, 2013, p. 
22). The various ethnic minorities within Yugoslavia had a long turbulent history of conflict 
and mutual acrimony that predated the relatively new and artificially created country 
	 37 
(Daalder, 1996, p. 37; Somerville, 2012, p. 65). Despite the hostilities, under Tito’s 
authoritarian regime the country was unified and “the common Yugoslav identity was forged 
through socialism and suppression of all particular or confessional identities” (Keränen, 
2017, p. 94).  
 
Figure 2: Map of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
	
Source: Office of the Historian (2018) 
 
In May of 1980 Tito’s death marked a historical political turning point for Yugoslavia 
(Biondich, 2005, p. 433; Seibert, 2018, p. 50). The power vacuum created after his death 
ushered in the (re)-emergence of virulent ethnic nationalism across the six constituent 
republics (Tucker, 2016, p. 506; Daalder, 1996, p. 37; Schwartz, 2010, p. 118). The former 
system of dictatorial leadership was succeeded by a presidential council comprised of 
representatives from each republic with a yearly rotating chairmanship (Hall, 2014, p. 359; 
Bennett, 2014, p. 98). This new political system, however, was unable to cope with the 
revival of societal divisions and the economic decline that characterized the 1980s. Indeed, 
by the early 1980s Yugoslavia experienced “periodic shortages in consumer and producer 
goods… falling growth rates (negative by 1983), decreasing real income and rising inflation” 
(Todorovic, 1996, p. 175). As for the government, it simply mirrored the flailing economy 
(Archer, 2007, p. 313). The presidential council lacked unity, consequently weakening the 
federal government’s authority and compounding the mounting ethnic and political tensions 
across the country (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 83; Amstutz, 2013, p. 22).  
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The absence of unity and effective political governance was most evident in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Seaman, 2018, p. 231). This republic was the most culturally diverse with “a 
numerically similar population of Muslims (44 per cent), Serbians (37 per cent) and 
Croatians (15 per cent, but with cross-border support from Croatia much larger), with 
Muslims concentrated in cities and Serbians in the countryside” (Rogel, 2004, p. 27; Kumar, 
2012, p. 607). This heterogeneity was reflected in the outcome of the 1990 general elections, 
with each political party’s size and nationality mirroring the country’s diverse populace 
(Kollander, 2004, p. 11). Against a backdrop of unrest and conflict within and amongst the 
other republics, unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina became increasingly unlikely, particularly 
as the ethnic populations’ support for their respective ‘motherlands’ grew in hopes of 
reunifying with them (ibid). A pivotal moment in the lead up to the outbreak of war came in 
March 1992 during the referendum on independence (Helsinki Watch, 1992, p. 8, 24). Faced 
with probable independence from the Yugoslav federation due to the Muslim and Croat 
alliance, and thus minority status in a newly independent state, the Serbs chose to boycott the 
referendum and refuted the results (Pickering, 2007, p. 26; O’Ballance, 1995, p. 9; Brigety II, 
2007, p. 100; Gow, 2003, p. 173).  
 
Shortly after the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, Serb forces in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina sought to delay recognition from the international community by instigating 
conflict and “creating a military fait accompli” (Lukic and Lynch, 1996, p. 205). However, 
the delay attempts failed and following international recognition in April of 1992 a full-scale 
war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bieber, 2006, p. 26). The war years were 
characterized by the strategic and systemic use of wartime sexual violence, primarily against 
Bosnian Muslim women (Simić, 2012, p. 85). The main goal of Bosnian Serbs was to 
ethnically cleanse the country through the instruments of rape and other forms of sexual 
violence against Muslim and Croatian women (Skinner, 2004, p. 28; Konradi and Schmidt, 
2004, p. 676). It should be noted that whilst members of all ethnicities perpetrated acts of 
wartime sexual violence, it was “the Serbs [that] possessed a greater military force, and it was 
they who initiated rape as a strategy of war within the broader context of ethnic cleansing or 
the forceful removal of civilian Muslims from conquered territory to establish a Greater 
Serbia” (Snyder et al., 2006, p. 189-190; MacDonald, 2008, p. 173).  
 
In particular, to facilitate the implementation of the ethnic cleansing policy Serb forces 
created what they termed concentration or detention camps that in effect served as rape 
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camps (Pierpaoli Jr., 2016, p. 184). The locations of the rape camps were numerous and 
varied, ranging from schools and hotels to commandeered private homes, and even animal 
stalls in barns (Schott, 2003, p. 103; Wood, 2013, p. 140; Totten and Bartrop, 2008, p. 356; 
Daniel-Wrabetz, 2007, p. 23). Within these rape camps, women and girls were subjected to 
repeated incidents of rape as part of the torture process in order to humiliate and terrorize 
them (LeBor, 2006, p. 150; Weisband, 2018, p. 336). The suffering caused by these acts 
reverberated onto society outside of the camps, because the violation of a community’s 
women equated the destruction of the groups’ identity (Williams, 2015, p. 30). In addition to 
subjugation and degradation, the rape camps also sought to deliberately and forcefully 
impregnate the captive Muslim and Croat women (Brouwer, 2005, p. 9; Skjelsbæk, 2001, p. 
220; Salzman, 1998, p. 358). Rather than be the simple byproduct of rape, these pregnancies 
were an integral part of the Serbian ethnic cleansing policy because the birth of these 
children, considered to be Serbs, would propagate the Serbian population across Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Allen, 2000, p. 624; Short, 2003, p. 514; Seto, 2013, p. 31).  
 
Though not as prevalent, men were also victims of sexual violence during the war, and 
particularly within the concentration camps (Sobreiro Sigora, Nassif Avellar and Carneiro 
Ribeiro, 2012, p. 252; MacKinnon, 2005, p. 315; Wood, 2013, p. 140). Similarly to female 
victims, males suffered not only rape, but also the mutilation and castration of genitalia 
(Simić, 2015, p. 243; Gerecke, 2010, p. 142). Male victims had acts of sexual violence 
committed against them by military forces, and were sometimes forced themselves to commit 
acts of sexual violence against other detainees (Vojdik, 2014, p. 924; Loncar, Henigsberg and 
Hrabac, 2010, p. 200). Men who were raped were “feminized by their subjugation and 
powerlessness, because [of the] stereotypical gender identities inhere in the dynamics of 
power that attend the commission of these atrocities” (Abreu, 2005, p. 6). As Skjelsbæk 
(2001, p. 225) argues, it was not only men’s masculinities that were feminized but also their 
ethnic identities; while Serb identities in turn were masculinized given their role as the 
predominant perpetrators of sexual violence.  
 
Despite the foregoing, the world remained largely passive in its stance towards the ongoing 
war until 1995 (Skjelsbæk, 2012, p. 28). Whilst the end of the Cold War brought about “a 
more enlightened policy towards international intervention” based on humanitarianism – 
which hitherto had been tainted with “the prism of an ideological conflict between 
communism and capitalism” – unfolding events elsewhere in the 1990s created obstacles to a 
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rapid intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Parish, 2010, p. 3-4). The war in Somalia in 
particular, which broke out following the ousting of General Mohamed Siad Barre in January 
1991, created a shortage of food and growing famine in that country (DiPrizio, 2002, p. 44-
45). Mounting criticism from regional organizations and the public to intervene and alleviate 
the widespread suffering caused by starvation and insecurity ultimately pressured the UN to 
launch Operation ‘Restore Hope’ in late 1992 (Wheeler, 2000, p. 175; Lepard, 2002, p. 11; 
Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2004, p. 56). However, the mission proved disastrous and 
the US eventually instilled a volte-face policy and withdrew from Somalia following the 
death of 18 American soldiers in October 1993(Parish, 2010, p. 4). In the throes of this 
fiasco, the international community proved hesitant to send troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
for a pre-emptive peacekeeping mission in early 1992, prior to the referendum on 
independence (ibid). A UN Protection Force was eventually deployed in 1993, but could do 
little to keep a non-existent peace; especially with a weak mandate (Dumbrell, 2009, p. 83). 
The continual failure by the UN to restore peace and protect civilians culminated in the 
Srebrenica massacre of 1995, where it is estimated that over 7,600 Muslims were killed by 
Serb forces (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, 2010, p. 109). These killings, coupled with the 
sexual violence and other atrocities taking place in close proximity to Western Europe, 
served as a catalyst and led to a material intervention by the international community in the 
conflict (Skjelsbæk, 2012, p. 28). 
 
Indeed, in the wake of the Srebrenica tragedy NATO – which had been involved in the 
Bosnian conflict but to a similar if not lesser extent than the UN – launched an air campaign 
dubbed Operation ‘Deliberate Force’; this action marked a transition from peacekeeping to 
peace-enforcement (Fenton, 2004, p. 171). The offensive involved hundreds of aircrafts and 
thousands of personnel from approximately 15 countries and targeted Serb forces (Hallams, 
2010, p. 31; Byman and Waxman, 2001, p. 257). It should be acknowledged that this 
considerable action was not only a response to the disastrous loss of life incurred from the 
Srebrenica massacre (Krieg, 2013, p. 88); as a protracted conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
– and the Balkans as a whole – would also be detrimental to the rest of Western Europe and 
its regional geo-strategic interests (ibid). While Operation Deliberate Force effectively 
brought an end to the Bosnian War, by this time “there was a widespread perception that the 
international community bore significant responsibility for the extent of the Bosnia 
catastrophe, due to mismanagement, hesitancy and bungling” (Parish, 2010, p. 5).  
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Accordingly, the peacebuilding efforts during the following decade in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina saw an unprecedented amount of international assistance – some estimates 
indicating over 5 billion US$ amounting to as much as 1,000 US$ per capita (Björkdahl, 
2013, p. 83; Friedman, 2004, p. 105; Tzifakis and Tsardanidis, 2006, p. 78; Welfens, 2001, p. 
133), compared to little over $56 per capita in development assistance for Rwanda in 1993 
according to World Bank estimates (The World Bank, 2018). Initially, much of the aid was 
focused on rebuilding basic infrastructure that had been completely destroyed by the war 
(Cousens and Cater, 2001, p. 89). The international community also made a significant effort 
to subsequently normalize Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international relations through 
integration into various global financial institutions (The World Bank, 1997, p. 6). This 
enabled Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish economic policies and channels through which 
foreign aid could be funneled and “limit the fiscal deficit of the consolidated public sector to 
levels compatible with available sources of foreign financing” (ibid).  
 
In addition to said financial aid, emphasis was placed on fostering reconciliation through the 
establishment of transitional justice mechanisms at the national and international levels in the 
form of War Crimes Chambers and an International Criminal Tribunal (Fischer, 2014, p. 107; 
Somun, 2010, p. 57). These were of paramount importance in light of the pervasive and 
extensive war crimes that were committed along ethnic lines (Orentlicher, 2018, p. 94). 
Based on the theory of retributive justice, the international community believed it could 
individualize guilt for the wartime atrocities, thereby creating an environment favorable to 
the (re)building of relations between the wider ethnic communities (Hoogenboom and 
Vieille, 2009, p. 195). In tandem, Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent a democratization 
process that was highly subject to international involvement (Chandler, 2000, p. 154). In 
accordance with the Dayton Agreement, the Office of the High Representative enforced a 
multiethnic consociational democracy (Miller, 2013, p. 102). When the 1996 elections 
brought to power the same pre-war parties, the Peace Implementation Council consequently 
decided to expand the powers of the High Representative, now enabling him to set laws and 
terminate officials (Keil and Perry, 2015, p. 6). Whilst some condemn the expansion and 
(indefinite) extension of the High Representative’s powers, “these powers have been 
[continuously] used to challenge the hold of the leading nationalist parties and encourage the 
emergence of non-nationalist politics” (Jenne, 2010, p. 86; Chandler, 2000, p. 113-114)  
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In sum, as it has been shown the international efforts in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina 
attempted to cover all facets of peacebuilding. Despite some criticisms of the consequences 
of the high level of international intervention – including the long-term effectiveness of the 
financial aid to the economy, remnants of socio-ethnic tensions due to a thin conception of 
reconciliation, and fragmented political system – Bosnia and Herzegovina has nonetheless 
remained at peace since the signing of the Dayton Agreement (Kostić, 2008, p. 409; 
Hoogenboom and Vieille, 2009, p. 195; Hill, 2011, p. 99). Arguably, were it not for the 
extensive level of outside involvement that followed after the war had ended, it is unlikely 
that the peacebuiding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been as successful, and 
war could have recurred in the later years as suggested by the large-N study. Accordingly, the 
analysis of the circumstances surrounding this deviant case study shows that it has not refuted 
the patterns of theory established in the large-N study – that peacebuilding success decreases 
as more time passes following the end of a conflict – but rather confirmed one of its key 
findings; namely that international assistance, particularly in the form of financial aid, greatly 
increases the probability of peacebuilding success in both the short and long-term.  
 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and implications of the main findings 
This research set out to investigate whether the prevalence of wartime sexual violence affects 
peacebuilding outcome. After establishing the theoretical propositions that inform the 
investigation, it was hypothesized that the higher the prevalence of wartime sexual violence, 
the lower the probability of successful peacebuilding. A large-N study of 51 conflicts during 
the period of 1989-2009 confirmed the hypothesis, but only within a 2-year period after the 
end of a war. It was found that the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 5-year 
period decreases when the prevalence of wartime sexual violence increases. The control 
variable ‘targeting of victims’ followed a similar pattern as the prevalence of wartime sexual 
violence: increasing the probability of successful peacebuilding within a 2-year period but 
decreasing it within a 5-year period. Accordingly, these results suggest that the lapse of time 
following the end of a conflict may be an important factor on the outcome of peacebuilding. 
The effect of the other control variable, net ODA received per capita (current US$), on 
peacebuilding outcome remained constant throughout both time periods; i.e. within both a 2 
and 5-year period the probability of successful peacebuilding increases when the net ODA 
received per capita (current US$) increases.  
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To further refine the theoretical propositions of this research, a brief deviant case study was 
also conducted. The deviant case analyzed was the Bosnian War (1992-1995). This case lent 
itself particularly well for evaluation because despite the massive levels of sexual violence, 
particularly rape, that were committed in a systematic and strategic manner, the 
peacebuilding efforts have proved successful in both the short and long-term (McDevitt-
Murphy, Casey and Cogdal, 2010, p. 293; Seto, 2013, p. 31). The analysis of the Bosnian 
War concluded that were it not for the extensive level of outside involvement that followed 
after the war had ended, it is unlikely that the peacebuiding efforts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would have been as successful, and war could have quickly recurred. Thus, 
rather than refute the patterns of theory established in the large-N study, the deviant case 
analysis confirmed one of its key findings, namely that international assistance, particularly 
in the form of financial aid, greatly increases the probability of peacebuilding success. 
 
The main findings of this research have important implications for policy-makers and 
practitioners alike. It appears that the current claims made by numerous international 
organizations in stating the importance of bringing support and restitution to victims, as well 
as justice by convicting perpetrators of wartime sexual violence are substantiated; particularly 
for lasting sustainable peace (Pruitt, 2012, p. 304; Wallström, 2012, p. 2; Boesten, 2014, p. 
99). In other words, the provision of differing types of care and services for victims of 
wartime sexual violence has to be immediate and sustained (International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 2018). Whilst this particularly difficult in post-conflict societies where state 
institutions are often non-functioning and “pre-existing health structures may have been 
uprooted”, the provision of international assistance can alleviate this strain thereby 
contributing to sustainable peace (Arieff, 2010, p.11; Heyzer, 2006, p. 353; Hout, 2013, p. 
144; Wake, 2008, p. 125). Indeed, sustained international assistance to conflict-emerging 
countries can support peacebuilding efforts through the promotion of democracy and 
reconstruction of civil society, especially if executed in a concerted and complimentary 
manner (Abdushukurova, 2008, p. 191; Tschirgi and de Coning, 2018, p. 445). In addition to 
supporting the importance of backward-looking mechanisms, such findings also highlight the 
necessity of establishing forward-looking mechanisms with the objective of avoiding future 
conflict and fostering new societal relations (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015, p. 175).  
 
By combining both mechanisms, society would experience a transformation “and adoption of 
psychosocial, political and economic, as well as legal, perspectives on justice” (Lambourne 
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and Rodriguez Carreon, 2016, p. 86). The increased participation of women in the post-
conflict peacebuilding process can also promote the creation of a culture of peace (Njoku, 
2014, p. 113; Karam, 2000, p. 12). As Ban Ki-moon the former UNSG (2010, p. 3) explains, 
women’s participation reinforces economic recovery, societal unity, governmental authority; 
otherwise known as the three pillars of sustainable peace (Aroussi, 2017, p. vii). The 
beneficial effect of women’s participation in the aftermath of conflicts is clearly evidenced in 
Sierra Leone (Pruitt, 2012, p. 309). Their involvement in the design of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission “helped lead to numerous important outcomes, including support 
for women’s organizations’ submissions to the truth commission, allowing witnesses to 
choose between public or private venues, and instituting a witness protection program for 
those impacted by crimes of gender-based violence” (ibid).  
 
Nonetheless as Dolan (2014, p. 83) notes, any and all responses to wartime sexual violence – 
particularly those that yield significant power like UNSCR – must be gender-inclusive in 
order to address all facets of this security and peace problem. That is, in our effort to include 
women we must ensure that men are not forgotten. Particularly within the area of wartime 
sexual violence, victimhood has tended to be gendered and synonymous with womanhood 
(Sjoberg, 2016, p. 139). Indeed, victims are often feminized whilst perpetrators are 
masculinized with few acknowledgements to the contrary (Skjelsbæk, 2012, p. 89).  Though 
women are undeniably to a greater extent the victims of wartime sexual violence, as Gorris 
(2015, p. 421) argues, international law and legal policy’s “blindness to conflict-related male 
sexual victimization not only impedes our understanding of the gendered dynamics of 
genocides, wars and armed conflict, but also prevents access to support services and justice 
for male victims”.  
 
In sum, giving wartime sexual violence the centrality it deserves in peacebuilding is essential 
in order to stabilize post-conflict societies and ultimately build sustainable peace by 
preventing the resurgence of war due to unaddressed grievances (Hague, 2012a, cited in 
Crawford, 2017, p. 130). Importantly, the establishment of enduring peace and security in 
post-conflict societies is truly a global affair given that the larger regional and international 
security of neighboring nations could be threatened if war were to recur (Hazen, 2013, p. 
181). 
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6.2 Research limitations and potential future research 
Any research involving the subject of wartime sexual violence must necessarily acknowledge 
that this phenomenon is difficult to both study and measure accurately (Hultman and 
Johansson, 2017, p. 146). The social stigma and cultural taboos that often accompany sexual 
violence leads to vast under-reporting by victims, particularly male survivors (Onyango and 
Hampanda, 2011, p. 238; Wood, 2010, p. 163; Priddy, 2014, p. 272). However, the research 
limitations surrounding wartime sexual violence are not limited to micro-level (Palermo and 
Peterman, 2011, p. 924). Structural obstacles include inaccessible or non-existing authorities 
to report to and what Berry (2017, p. 833) terms the ‘political settlement structure’ that 
creates hierarchies of victimhood (Ferrales and McElrath, 2014, p. 683; Henry, 2009, p. 124). 
As a consequence of under-reporting governments have been able “to downplay the problem, 
with the result that rape and related crimes have tended to be treated as an unfortunate form 
of collateral damage” (Human Security Centre, 2006, p. 108). Methodological limitations, 
such as the conceptualization of wartime sexual violence and incentive bias, can also impede 
the investigation and collection of information regarding this topic (Aoláin, 2016, p. 95). 
Despite these difficulties, wartime sexual violence continues to be a pertinent and persistent 
issue that can no longer be overlooked or negated (Reis and Vann, 2006, p. 19). Continual 
research is thus necessary in order to improve our understanding of wartime sexual violence 
and its potential impact on post-conflict peacebuilding. Rather than focus on peacebuilding as 
a whole – a concept that can prove difficult to operationalize – future research could limit 
itself to investigating the impact of wartime sexual violence on one specific aspect of the 
peacebuilding process such as democratization or nation-building. 
  
	 46 
Appendix 
Logit model in terms of the log of odds: simple logistic regression for 2-year period 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑃(𝑌 = 1)1− 𝑃(𝑌 = 1) = −0.84+ 0.11𝑋 
 
Logit model in terms of probabilities: simple logistic regression for 2-year period 
 𝑝 𝑦 = 1 =  exp(−0.84+ 0.11𝑋)exp −0.84+ 0.11𝑋 + 1 
 
Logit model in terms of the log of odds: simple logistic regression for 5-year period 
 𝑙𝑛 𝑃(𝑌 = 1)1− 𝑃(𝑌 = 1) = −0.40+−0.10𝑋 
 
Logit model in terms of probabilities: simple logistic regression for 5-year period 
 𝑝 𝑦 = 1 =  exp(−0.40+−0.10𝑋)exp −0.40+−0.10𝑋 + 1	
 
Strength of association 
coefficient of 
determination 
> 0.5 High 
0.3 – 0.5 Moderate 
0.1 – 0.3 Low 
0 – 0.1 Insubstantial 
 
Full version of Table 5. Simple logistic regression for 2-year period 
Peacebuilding 
2-year 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) z P>z 
[95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Prevalence 0.11 (0.29) 0.38 0.701 -0.45 0.67 
Constant -0.84 (0.48) -1.74 0.082 -1.78 0.11 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0023 
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.39 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
	 47 
Full version of Table 6. Simple logistic regression for 5-year period 
Peacebuilding 
5-year 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) z P>z 
[95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Prevalence -0.10 (0.28) -0.34 0.733 -0.65 0.46 
Constant -0.40 (0.46) -0.87 0.382 -1.29 0.50 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo r2 = 0.0017 
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.62 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Full version of Table 7. Multivariate logistic regression for 2-year period 
Peacebuilding 
2-year 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) z P>z 
[95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Prevalence 0.01 (0.31) 0.04 0.964 -0.60 0.63 
Targeting 1.78 (4.12) 0.43 0.665 -6.29 9.85 
ODA 0.005 (0.007) 0.71 0.475 -0.008 0.018 
Constant -1.03 (0.53) -1.92 0.055 -2.07 0.02 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0140 
Log pseudolikelihood = -32.01 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Full version of Table 8. Multivariate logistic regression for 5-year period 
Peacebuilding 
5-year 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) z P>z 
[95% Confidence 
Interval] 
Prevalence -0.12 (0.31) -0.40 0.692 -0.73 0.48 
Targeting -0.31 (4.12) -0.07 0.941 -8.38 7.76 
ODA 0.003 (0.007) 0.47 0.639 -0.010 0.016 
Constant -0.48 (0.50) -0.96 0.338 -1.47 0.50 
Number of observations = 51 
Pseudo R2 = 0.0050 
Log pseudolikelihood = -33.51 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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